corporate groups in Japanese industrial organization (Spulber, 2002; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002b) , tales of Japanese banking figure prominently in relationship banking studies. And prominently they sport a "main bank." They assert (as we detail in Subsections 2 and 3 below) that most Japanese firms maintain a long-term relationship with such a main bank; that these main banks closely monitor their debtors; that they monitor as well for the other banks; that they rescue defaulting debtors; and that their recent decline explains Japan's current economic malaise.
All this makes the Japanese main bank, in Patrick's (1994: 359) words, nothing less than "the epitome of relationship banking." Scholars like Mayer (1988) and Rajan (1992) use the Japanese example to motivate their classic accounts of relational banking theory, and well they might --for the stylized main bank fits the theory to a tee. As "a long-term relationship between a firm and a particular bank from which the firm obtains its largest share of borrowings," contend Aoki and his co-authors, the Japanese main bank system captures the essence of "relational contracting between banks and firms." 2 Over the past couple of decades, scholars have used the concept of the main bank to illustrate a wide variety of issues in relational banking theory. Exploring collective action problems among creditors, Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein (1990 , 1991 claim main banks lower the cost of financial distress. Focusing more broadly on informational issues, Miyajima (1998: 43) states that they "facilitated corporate investment by mitigating information problems." Addressing the monopoly power of a relational bank, Weinstein & Yafeh (1998) and McGuire (2002) argue that main banks extract rents from their debtors. And studying the indeterminacy of price signals in a relational environment, Rajan & Zingales (1998) blame main bank finance for the current Japanese depression.
2. The contours of the main bank relationship. --(a) Introduction. Exactly what a main bank relationship entails is harder to know --and for good reason: no one has seen a main bank contract. Even by the most committed of main-bank scholars, banks and firms make these arrangements "implicitly." Yet that they negotiated the arrangements implicitly, of course, is to say they did not negotiate them at all. Instead, they left them to mutually unstated assumptions.
The point is crucial. Scholars do not claim banks negotiated a contract but left it incompletely specified. Such contracts are still "explicit," and Japanese courts regularly enforce vague documents. They do not claim banks negotiated a contract but left it unwritten. Oral contracts are "explicit" as well, and Japanese courts regularly enforce them too.
This absence of any contract among the parties makes hypotheses about the main bank system tantalizingly hard to test. Nonetheless, subject to variety of qualifications, most writers posit the following core propositions.
(b) All big firms have one. First, most large firms have a main bank. As Flath (2000: 259) put it, " [a] lmost every large corporation in Japan maintains a special relationship with some particular bank, the company's 'main bank.'" Scholars may dispute how many small firms have a main bank, but virtually none contests the claim that most large firms have one. 3 (c) The main bank lends and gathers information. Second, the main bank serves as a firm's principal lender and a major shareholder, and through those ties acquires information. In the process, it becomes the "central repository of information on the borrower" (Milhaupt, 2001 (Milhaupt, : 2087 . The "close information-sharing relationship that exists between the bank and the firm," claims Sheard (1989: 403) , constitutes the "cornerstone" of the system.
(d) It monitors and intervenes in corporate governance. Third, using that information, the main bank monitors and helps govern the firm. "The main bank system is central to the way in which corporate oversight," explain Aoki, Patrick & Sheard (1994: 4) , "is exercised in the Japanese capital market." Indeed, writes Flath (2000: 288) , "main banks could be counted upon to closely monitor the investment choices of their client firms."
Armed with information, the main bank then intervenes in firm governance. Declares Sheard (1994: 210) , the "central role" of the main bank in "corporate governance of large firms is beyond dispute." Typically, it acquires that role through posts on the board. In Aoki, Patrick & Sheard's (1994: 15) words, the "main bank often has its managers sit as directors or auditors on the board of client firms." 4 (e) It monitors on behalf of all debtors. Fourth, the main bank does not just monitor for itself; it monitors for all creditors. Restated, the other banks delegate to it the task of monitoring the debtor and skirt the duplicative monitoring that would otherwise ensue (Hoshi, 1998: 861; see Peek & Rosengren, 2003: 3; Aoki, 2001: 16) . Because each money-center bank serves as main bank to a group of firms it monitors, no one bank incurs excessive monitoring costs. Because "reputational concerns" cause each to stay informed about those firms, through the reciprocally delegated monitoring the main bank system effectively "subjects firms to investor control" (Rajan, 1996 (Rajan, : 1364 .
(f) It rescues. Fifth, the main bank intervenes in the affairs of financially constrained firms and rescues them. By Hoshi & Kashyap's (2001: 5) account, it "step [s] up and organize[s] a workout" when "firms [run] into financial difficulty." It launches "rescue operations [that] prevent the premature liquidation of temporarily depressed, but potentially productive, firms," contends Aoki. 5 Like an idealized textbook bankruptcy regime, it first distinguishes financial constraints from economic malaise. It then rescues and restructures those firms that are economically healthy but financially constrained. Quite what the "rescue" entails (much less how one should operationalize it empirically), however, is an issue on which most observers seem not to agree.
3. The main bank and the current malaise. --All this makes for a theoretically intriguing story but an equally elusive empirical quarry: no bank, firm, or scholar has ever seen a "main bank" contract, and no one has advanced a definition many other observers want to use. Fortunately for the empiricist, however, the 1990s depression introduces a more clearly testable hypothesis. According to main bank theorists, the firms that flirted with insolvency in the 1990s were those that had expanded most aggressively in the late-1980s. They had expanded during the late-1980s because the earlier financial deregulation had cut them loose from their main bank. Freed from the monitoring that had held them in check, they gambled badly in the late-1980s and suffered in the 1990s.
The deregulation matters because of its effect on competition, and the competition because of its effect on relational stability. According to many relationship-banking scholars, firms and banks can more effectively maintain stable long-term relationships when financial markets are less competitive. The "only way to promote relationships," suggest Petersen & Rajan (1995: 442) , may be "by restricting credit-market competition." "Since the theoretic models rely on future rents or quasi-rents to maintain incentive compatibility," explain Gorton & Winton (2003: 33) , "competition should ... undermine relationships." 6 According to the conventional wisdom, the Japanese government promoted relationship banking by restricting financial competition (but see Miwa & Ramseyer, 2003b) . Under the post-war regime, reasons Rajan (1996 Rajan ( : 1364 , the "restrictions on bond market financing forced firms to stay in long-term relationships" with banks. In turn, the resulting stability gave those "banks both the incentive to subsidize them in times of distress and the ability to recoup the subsidy in the long run."
When the government loosened those bond-market restrictions in 1980s, firms that could tap market finance did so and jettisoned their main banks. Alas, given the way investors for decades had relied on the main bank for monitoring, Japan lacked the monitoring mechanisms in place in other advanced economies. Effectively, the earlier main bank system had "obviat[ed] a need" for "more arm's length market-oriented" governance mechanisms to develop.
7 Because they could count on the main bank to monitor, writes Flath (2000: 288) , shareholders had been able to "disengage from these activities with little fear of adverse consequences."
Once firms found that their main banks could no longer police them, main bank scholars continue, they gambled. Formerly well-run firms played the real-estate and stock markets, and fed speculative bubbles. When prices collapsed at the end of the decade, they found themselves without recourse.
The tale appears in a wide array of accounts, but Aoki articulates it as well as any. 8 The new bond markets in the 1980s, he reasons, cut the ties between firms and banks. As those ties loosened, the firms became "freed from the bank's implicit and 6 Compare Rajan & Zingales (1998) and Yafeh & Yosha (2001 ), with Boot & Thakor (2000 ; Boot (2000) . 7 Aoki, Patrick & Sheard (1994: 5) . See Miwa & Ramseyer (2002a , 2003c for evidence to the contrary. 8 (2001: 91) . To similar effect: e.g., Gao (2001: 184) ; Gilson (1998: 216-17) ; Kester (1992: 39) ; Miyajima (1998) . Rajan & Zingales (1998) apply the logic to East Asia more generally, and Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) and Hellman, Murdock & Stiglitz (2000) use a similar logic to argue that financial liberalization explains the incidence of financial crises. explicit intervention." This, in turn, "diminish[ed] the flow of information from firms to city banks and consequently the bank's ability to keep track of the firm's business" (Aoki, 1994: 137) . In the process, the deregulation triggered "a negative incentive effect on the insiders of the firm, as they became free from any external discipline" (Aoki, 2001: 91; accord, Aoki, 1994: 137) .
Once their best clients had abandoned them for bonds, the banks courted firms they had earlier spurned. With newfound access to cash, mediocre firms now found they could play the bubble too (e.g., Dinc & McGuire, 2002: 7) . As deregulation let "key bank clients ... sharply reduc[e] their dependence on bank financing," contend Hoshi & Kashyap (1999: 4) , banks turned to new clients. Unfortunately, those "new lines of business ... turned out badly." (id., at 4; see Gao, 2001: 186) . Prices fell in the early 1990s, and these firms now failed as well. D. Puzzles:
1. The explanatory puzzle. --We do not quarrel with the notion that banks economize on screening and monitoring costs, any more than we quarrel with Coase's point that firms economize on the costs of using the market. As Alchian & Demsetz (1972: 783) said about the latter, "it is a difficult proposition to disagree with or refute." Crucially, however, Alchian & Demsetz then pointed out that if the market is not free, neither is the firm --and people have access to many ways of organizing their productive activities. To advance the empirical enterprise, we need to know the relative costs of the market, the firm, and these various alternatives.
So too with the economics of information and banking theory. Many banks do economize on screening and monitoring expenses over the market, but they introduce their own costs in the process. What is more, investors already face a wide variety of ways to screen and monitor. They face not just decentralized securities markets, but mutual funds, insurance companies, leasing firms, and a host of others besides. Given these alternatives, the possibility remains that banking --as Merton Miller (1998: 8) put it --"is not only basically 19th-century technology, but ... disaster-prone technology" that survives only as a regulatory artifact. At root, information economics does not give us a theory of banks. It gives us a theory of financial intermediaries more generally, and does little to distinguish those other intermediaries from the banks.
2. The puzzling applicability to Japan. --By its own terms, moreover, relationship-banking theory applies only haphazardly to the Japanese main bank accounts anyway. As a theory, the relationship-banking logic applies only to the least competitive financial markets, and within those markets only to the smaller firms. Thus, to date scholars have located the greatest evidence of relationship banking in those sectors most insulated from financial market competition. Peterson & Rajan (1995) , for example, find relationship banking most pronounced in the most concentrated banking markets. Fundamentally (for reasons outlined in Subsections B. & C.3. above), the logic behind relationship banking theory simply does not apply to competitive modern capital markets.
Yet the large Japanese firms have been raising funds on precisely such competitive markets for decades. Although most firms found the bond market inaccessible, large firms could readily raise money through a wide variety of other channels. Most obviously, they could tap the stock market --which never faced the restrictions found for bonds. Alternatively, they could turn to over 100 banks and insurance companies for loans, and regularly borrowed large sums as trade credit from their business partners. Although the government purported to ration credit, in substance it never did. Instead, the lending market cleared at competitive prices.
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What is more, relationship banking theorists never claimed that the logic applied to large firms, and empiricists working on non-Japanese examples seldom find it there. In Petersen & Rajan's (1995) early formulation, again, relationship banking in the U.S. characterizes only small-firm finance. Bernanke (1983) uses an earlier variant of the theory to explore the impact of bank failures on small firms in the 1930s. Degryse & Van Cayseele (2000) apply it to small firms in Europe, while Berger & Udell (1995) and Blackwell & Winters (1997) again apply it to small firms in the U.S.
These limits to the logic seem to have been lost on those who would apply it to Japan. There, scholars focus on the very biggest exchange-listed firms. They do not argue that most Japanese firms have a main bank. Instead, they argue that most large firms have a main bank. Of the many small firms in Japan, most observers instead claim that "few if any have main banks" (Flath, 2000: 283) .
As the summary above should make clear, however, relationship banking theory does not fit large listed firms. Much of the analytical apparatus hinges on the "monopoly power" a relational bank acquires over a firm through the information it collects. "Without market power," reason Yafeh & Yosha (2001: 66) , "banks would not be able to extract rents generated by investment in ties with firms, and consequently there would be little or no relationship banking." Without that market power, in short, most relationshipbanking models simply unravel. This "monopoly" or "market" power that a bank would acquire over a firm is a power it could plausibly acquire only over relatively small firms in relatively uncompetitive financial markets. Over firms that can readily borrow only from one or two regional banks, perhaps a relational bank (whether in Japan or anywhere else) could acquire that power in time. It will not acquire the power over the large. Exchange-listed Japanese firms typically borrow only 15-35 percent of their debt from their lead bank, and spread the rest over many others. Necessarily, if a firm raises equity capital on a national exchange and borrows from many banks besides, no bank will have "monopoly power" over its finance. Tale  A. Testable Implications: Consider, now, whether the Japanese main bank story fits the data. Because we define a firm's main bank as the bank that lends the firm the largest share of its debt, we do not test the proposition that all firms have a main bank.
II. Testing the
10 Because observers attribute 9 See Miwa & Ramseyer (2003b) for details. The "deregulation" to which observers refer involved primarily the liberalization of the bond market and the elimination of the restrictions on deposit interest rates. The bank loan market had been highly competitive for decades (id.). Even before this "deregulation," large firms had diversified their loans among many banks (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002b) . 10 More precisely, for Past Main-Bankers, Concurrent Main-Bankers, MB Loan Fraction, and MB Change, a firm's main bank is the institution with the greatest amount of loans outstanding at the firm. Inter alia, this approach tracks Campbell & Hamao (1994) , Kang & Stulz (2000) , and Morck, Nakamura & Shivdasani (2000) . Weinstein & Yafeh (1998) , Horiuchi, Packer & Fukuda (1988) , Nakamura (1999), and McGuire (2003) instead use one of the several keiretsu rosters as a proxy for main-bank affiliation. For reasons we detail in Miwa & the phenomenon only to the largest firms, we table our misgivings above and direct our inquiry to the larger exchange-listed firms. We then extract the following testable implications from the main bank literature:
1. Monitoring by main banks. If banks regularly monitor their debtors and participate in corporate governance through board appointments, then most firms should include several representatives from their main bank on the board; if banks focus on their more troubled clients, then declines in firm performance should lead to increases in the number of main bank representatives on a board.
2. Delegation of monitoring. If a firm's secondary lenders delegate their monitoring to the firm's main bank, then banker-directors overwhelmingly should be affiliated with the main bank rather than other banks.
3. Rescues by main banks. If a main bank implicitly agrees to rescue troubled firms, then a decline in performance should lead to (i) a decrease in a firm's inclination to change its main bank affiliation, and (ii) an increase in the fraction of a firm's debt borrowed from the main bank.
4. Deregulation and the depression. If deregulation-induced disintermediation caused economic decline by reducing bank monitoring, then (i) those firms that most sharply reduced their dependence on bank debt should have grown most rapidly in the booming late 1980s, and (ii) those firms that grew most rapidly should then have earned the lowest profits in the depressed 1990s.
B. The Data:
For this project, we examine all non-bank firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). These are the largest of the listed firms. We collect financial data from 1980 to 1994, and board composition data in 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 . We take our basic financial data from the Nikkei NEEDS and QUICK data bases. From the Kabushiki toshi shueki ritsu, we then add shareholder returns, and from the Kigyo keiretsu soran gather information on board composition. With this data, we construct the following variables. We include selected summary statistics in Table 1 .
[Insert 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95 .
Profitability: The ratio of a firm's operating income (#95 of the Nikkei NEEDS data base) to total assets (#89) for each year, averaged over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. Positive Profits: 1 if a firm's Profitability were positive, 0 otherwise, for 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 .
Growth: The annual growth rate, in percentage, of a firm's total assets, averaged over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. Total Assets: The average total assets of a firm (#89) over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 , in million yen.
Tangible Assets/TA: The average ratio of a firm's tangible assets (#21) to total assets (#89) over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. Leverage: The average ratio of a firm's total liabilities (#77) to total assets (#89) over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 .
Total Bank Loans: The average total of a firm's bank loans, over 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 , in million yen.
Total Bank Loan Increase: The increase (as a fraction) of a firm's bank loans, within the periods 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 .
MB Loan Fraction:
The mean fraction of a firm's bank loans from its main bank, for 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94 .
MB Loan Fraction Increase:
The increase (as a fraction) of a firm's bank loans from its main bank, within the periods 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. (kansayaku), on the grounds that Japanese discussions of "yakuin" (colloquially translated as "directors") typically include the kansayaku. 13 That is, in most cases, the directors chosen at the first shareholders' general meeting after the 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 MB Change: 1 if the identity of a firm's main bank changed, for 1980-85, 1986-90, and 1990-94. 3. Industry dummies. 1. Introduction. --According to the conventional accounts, main banks dominate the firms for which they serve as main bank by posting their officers to the boards of the firms. In fact, they almost never do so. For each of the four years on which we have board composition data (1980, 1985, 1990, 1995) , 92 to 96 percent of the firms had no main bank officer on their board (Tab. 2, Pan. A.).
[Insert Table 2 about here.] Fundamentally, scholars and journalists confuse bank officers with retired bank officers. If a bank wanted to use board representation to monitor, it would not rely on someone who had quit the bank, had no plans to return to the bank, and depended instead on the firm for his future livelihood. Instead, it would place someone currently on the bank payroll who forfeits his future career at the bank if he proves disloyal.
Yet to the extent firms name anyone from the banking sector to the board, they name retired bankers. During our four years, 53 to 56 percent of the firms had a retired bank officer on their board, and 38 to 40 percent had a retired officer from their main bank. Even retired bankers, however, the firms do not name many. The mean firm had 1.1 retired bank officers on its board. It had only 0.2 to 0.3 directors serving at a bank concurrently.
2. Determinants of banker appointments. --Why do the firms that do name bankers to the board name them? Most firms appoint only bankers who have no incentive to stay loyal to the bank, many firms appoint no bankers at all, and those that do appoint bankers appoint too few to let them "dominate" governance. But why do the firms name any bankers? 14 (a) The Kaplan & Minton hypothesis. According to Kaplan & Minton (1994) , firms appoint the bankers because banks use board appointments to monitor declining borrowers.
15 Banks place their officers and retired officers on a borrower's board, they imply, when the borrower falls into distress. Once there, the bankers then pressure the distressed firm to replace its CEO.
Kaplan & Minton assemble board composition and financial data on the 119 largest TSE-listed firms from 1980 to 1988. They then use logit regressions on the panel data to estimate the likelihood that a firm will appoint a new banker-director. A firm is more likely to do so, they find: (a) if it earned low stock returns the previous year (similarly, Morck & Nakamura, 1999) , or (b) if it had a pre-tax loss (a dichotomous variable) that year. They locate no evidence that a firm's pre-tax income (as a continuous variable) predicts banker appointments.
(b) The puzzle. These are puzzling results. Rational shareholders would not radically change their governance structure after either a one-year stock return drop or a one-year accounting loss. Neither would a rational creditor radically change its monitoring strategy. Instead, rational shareholders (as principals) and managers (as agents) would have tried to structure their relationship ex ante to align the managers' incentives with shareholder preferences.
Granted, shareholders will never align their managers' incentives perfectly. If they cannot observe managerial effort or ability, they may then sometimes choose to reward or punish their managers after the fact. Yet if they do have access to information about either effort or ability, they will use that information rather than outcome measures. When forced nonetheless to rely on outcome, they will choose measures with as little noise as possible.
For several reasons, most Japanese firms have both (a) relatively reliable information about effort and ability, and (b) less noisy indices of outcome. Most Japanese firms pick most executives through internal tournaments rather than recruit them on the lateral market. Necessarily, they will usually have elaborate information about the ability and work habits of their senior managers.
Japanese firms will also have access to less noisy indices of performance than either shareholder returns or pre-tax losses. Returns fluctuate widely, both by year and by industry. The correlation of ROI is -.51 between 1980-85 and 1985-90, and -.40 between 1985-90 and 1990-95 . A regression of 1985-90 ROI on prior period ROI yields an R squared of 26 percent, and of 1995-90 ROI on the prior period of 15 percent. Within 1985-90, mean ROI ranged from 32.5 in construction, 21.8 in light industry, to 16.7 in chemicals.
Pre-tax losses are even more haphazard. By their nature losses are transitory. A "firm has an abandonment put option to discontinue the loss-making ... operation and recoup the book value of the firm's assets," explains Kothari (2001: 132-33) . "So, only firms expecting to improve will continue operations, which means that observed losses would be temporary." Precisely because they are transitory, losses bear but a tenuous relation to a firm's expected cash flows. Whether among U.S. firms (Hayn, 1995) or Japanese (Obinata, 2003: 14-16) , losses have but a loose association to stock prices.
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If all this is true (i.e., if firms choose their governance structures to align the incentives of their officers and shareholders, and monitor officers by more finely turned measures than loss years) then we should observe no statistically significant relation between director turnover and accounting losses. Although this is not a happy situation for the empiricist, it is one he often faces when markets work well. If markets clear, for example, producers will rarely earn extra profits (a principle about which Stigler [1963: 54] declared that " [t] hat there is no more important proposition in economic theory") --but the empiricist cannot prove the point through significant results. If they impound information quickly, stock makets will be informationally efficient --but the empiricist will not have significant results to prove it (Fama, 1998). Our claim --that Japanese firms will choose governance structures that align managerial and shareholder incentives reasonably well --is exactly such a claim: markets work effectively.
(c) Our exercise. To explore these puzzles in more detail, we replicate the Kaplan-Minton study but from a different vantage. First, where they use data only on the 119 largest TSE firms, we study all Section 1 firms (the largest 900-1,000 firms). Second, where they end their study in 1988, we extend it through 1994. This lets us study purported bank monitoring in both good times and bad.
Third, where Kaplan & Minton group retired bank officers with those holding concurrent bank appointments, we disentangle the two. The two groups do face fundamentally different incentives: retired bankers will never again work at the bank, while concurrent bankers have careers that hinge on their loyalty to it. If a bank puts people on boards to monitor borrowers on its behalf, it ought primarily to use current officers rather than those who have quit.
Fourth, where Kaplan & Minton use a panel dataset, we use semi-decanal averages. Although this forces us to regress board changes on performance in the same period, it lets us ask whether any apparent governance shift is more than temporary. Simultaneously, it lets us ask whether those governance shifts that are long-term reflect long-term performance patterns.
Fifth, where Kaplan & Minton use a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm appointed any new banker-director (analogously, Morck & Nakamura, 1999) , we use a continuous variable that reflects the net change in banker representation on the board. This lets us capture shifts in the magnitude of the banking industry's representation on the board.
Our net change measure also lets us focus on those banker appointments that genuinely alter bank representation. As Kaplan & Minton (1994: 233) note, 45 percent of the new bankers merely replace other bankers. Forty-five percent of the data points in their dependent variable, in other words, capture appointments that do nothing to change the level of banker representation on the boards. various accounting measures in Japan. As logic would suggest, he finds substantially greater association between rates of return on stock and operating income than between rates of return and pre-tax income.
Last, where Kaplan & Minton use only year dummies as additional explanatory variables, we add further controls. Because a firm's willingness to appoint an outside director may vary with the total number of directors, we include Board Size. Because that willingness may also vary with a borrower's size and leverage, we include Total Assets, Leverage, and Total Bank Loan Increase. Because a borrower's ability to provide mortgageable assets may reduce the need for monitoring by a lender, we include Tangible Assets/TA. Because any bank's interest in monitoring a firm may depend on the extent to which the firm has diversified its borrowings, we include MB Loan Fraction. And because all this may vary from sector to sector, we include seven industry dummies (the omitted industry is metals).
For our dependent variable, we use the change in the number of past, concurrent, and total bankers on the board over each of our three periods: Past Banker Increase, Concurrent Banker Increase, and Total Banker Increase, over 1980-85, 1985-90, and 1990-95 . We focus on the two right-hand variables closest to those that Kaplan & Minton find significant: a firm's stock returns (ROI), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's profitability is positive (Positive Profits). To explore whether banks respond quickly or more deliberately, we alternately regress our dependent variable on (a) the independent variables for the same half decade and (b) on those variables for the preceding half decade.
Readers may note that a firm's stock market performance is plausibly endogenous to the firm's expected board appointments. That endogeneity, however, is not unique to our specification. Instead, it is basic to the Kaplan & Minton study that we replicate here.
We report our coefficients and t-statistics on Table 4 . 18 For our first set of results (Panel A), we include coefficients and t-statistics for all variables (Panel A). To conserve space, for the rest of our results we report the coefficients and t-statistics only for our key performance variables.
[Insert Table 3 , for example, the data show little evidence that banks appoint bankers as monitors to the boards of troubled firms. During all periods, most firms --whether profitable or unprofitable --choose not to change the number of bankers on their boards. Although some firms do increase the number of bankers, about the same number reduce them. What is more --and contrary to the bank-monitoring hypothesis --the firms that increase their bankers are not disproportionately underperformers. Instead, profitable firms sometimes increase their banker directors too. Whether the least profitable firms appoint more or fewer bankers seems to vary both by the period involved, and by whether we examine retired or concurrent bankers. In all periods and for both categories of bankers, however, most firms leave the number of banker directors unchanged.
Regression results. Whether the Kaplan-Minton effect appears in regression analysis similarly depends on the dataset and regression specifications. According to Table 4 , virtually all the coefficients on the performance variables are insignificant. Most obviously, all regressions on prior period performance are insignificant. This is consistent with Kaplan & Minton, who conclude that the banks respond almost instantaneously.
More curiously, however, all regressions --whether on prior-or current-period performance --using Past Banker Increase and Total Banker Increase are also insignificant. Kaplan & Minton obtain significant results with a dependent variable that captures any new banker appointment, whether a retired banker or one still holding a bank post. By contrast, in Table 4 only Concurrent Banker Increase yields significant results. These, moreover, are haphazard: although the coefficient on Positive Profits is significantly negative (as Kaplan & Minton predict) in two of the three periods, for one period the coefficient on ROI is significant and positive --exactly the opposite of what Kaplan & Minton find.
Although this possible focus on concurrent rather than retired banker-directors is consistent with bank monitoring (given the different incentives the two groups face), it highlights the peripheral nature of any such phenomenon. At root, concurrent bankers are few and far between. Of all our firms, 82-86 percent had no such directors (Tab. 2). Even most loss firms had none. Of the 14 loss firms in 1980-84, 11 had no concurrent banker-directors; of the 43 loss firms in 1985-90, 40 had none; and of the 48 in 1990-94, 41 had none.
Kaplan & Minton. Indeed, the Kaplan-Minton result itself hinges on small numbers. To replicate their study more closely, we tried restricting our sample to the largest 100 firms. We abandoned it, though, when we found that none of the 100-biggest firms had negative earnings for the first (1980-84) five-year period. In the second period, only one did, and in the third only three.
According to Kaplan & Minton themselves, their panel dataset included 933 firmyears. Of those observations, 8.8 percent involved negative earnings (82 firm-years), and 7.5 percent involved a new banker appointment (70 firm years). Kaplan & Minton calculate that the odds of appointing a banker increased at the loss firms from 7.5 percent for the sample at large by an additional 12.9 percentage points.
19 Apparently, the firms subject to the 82 loss firm-years appointed about 17 bankers. Absent the extra 12.9 percent, they would have appointed 6. During the 9 years Kaplan & Minton studied (and given average director tenure of about 8 years), their 119 firms would have appointed over 2,000 directors. Their loss-based evidence for bank monitoring, however, lies in 11 extra bankers appointed during those 9 years.
(e) Stock measures rather than flow. Might the reason under-performing firms do not increase their banker-directors more dramatically be that they already have plenty?
Might the right measure of bank monitoring, in other words, be not the "flow" of new directors but the "stock"?
To explore this possibility, we regress the total number of past and concurrent banker-directors on our Table 4 independent variables. As our dependent variable, we use the number of banker-directors at the beginning and end of each period, and as independent variables we use the mean figures for the half decade.
20 Again, we follow Kaplan & Minton in focusing on Positive Profits and ROI. We present the results in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 about here.] We find these results haphazard enough to raise doubts about this "stock" version of the bank-monitoring hypothesis. Table 4 (as well as basic theory) suggests that if banks do use board appointments to monitor, they would use concurrent rather than retired officers. Yet Table 5 Panel II.A. indicates that the concurrent bankers are not in the loss firms. Instead, they serve at the better-performing firms. Only with retired bankers do we find any evidence that they might have been more common among the poorer performing firms, and then only for the 1980-85 period (Panel I.B.).
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(f) An alternative explanation. Although Kaplan & Minton interpret their results as bank monitoring, those very results suggest another hypothesis: perhaps they locate evidence of more fundamental restructuring at the very worst-performing firms. Perhaps, in other words, the shareholders at the most troubled firms sacked all or most of their directors, and then appointed new bankers at the same time that they replaced the others. Because Kaplan & Minton only coded directoral appointments for bankers and a few others, they would not have noticed the rest of the new appointments. Yet the firms would have replaced the bankers for the same reasons they replaced the rest --and Kaplan & Minton's conclusion would simply reflect the data they chose to collect at the outset.
Consider the two alternatives in more detail. If banks placed bankers on the boards of troubled firms to monitor on their behalf, then economic distress (a) would trigger the appointment of additional bankers, but (b) would not trigger the replacement of existing bankers with new ones. Conversely, if the most troubled firms sometimes replaced their entire board, then (provided they kept the ratio of bankers to non-bankers constant) economic distress (a) would trigger the replacement of existing bankers, but (b) would not trigger the appointment of any additional bankers. Consistent with the latter We stress our OLS results rather than Poisson because of the stringent requirements relating to the mean and variance of the data for use of the latter. See Greene (1997: 937) . However, for reference we include the Poisson results as Appendix A-2. 21 In unreported regressions, we use Profitability rather than Positive Profits. Where the dependent variable is the increase in banker-directors, all coefficients on Profitability yield t-statistics in analogous regressions of under 2. The coefficient is negative in 10 specifications, and positive in 5 (we alternatively regress the banker increase on current and past period profits). Where the dependent variable is Past Banker, the coefficient on Profitability is uniformly negative. The t-statistic is above 2 when we regress 1985 bankers on 1986-90 Profitability and 1990 bankers on 1990-94 Profitability. Where the dependent variable is Current Banker, the coefficient on Profitability is uniformly positive. The t-statistic is above 2 when we regress 1990 bankers on 1986-90 Profitability and on 1990-94 Profitability.
hypothesis but not the former, Kaplan & Minton find that loss firms do appoint new bankers while we find that they do not appoint additional bankers.
Kaplan & Minton focus on firms that post a loss year --and some evidence does suggest that firms time their losses to coincide with restructuring. In the U.S., for example, when new senior executives take over troubled companies they sometimes accelerate discretionary expenses to post a "big bath."
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In Japan, departing senior executives of troubled companies are said sometimes to accelerate losses on their way out. If departing executives did choose to accelerate losses, Kaplan & Minton's pre-tax income would reflect it. Because pre-tax income comes net a variety of discretionary gains and losses, Japanese CEOs hoping to defer a loss can do so by defering depreciation allowances or selling appreciated stock. CEOs determined to post a "big bath" can do the opposite.
Take the shipbuilding industry in the late 1980s. Although firms in most industries did well in the 1980s, shipbuilding firms found themselves in crisis. By the middle of the decade, the tanker sales boom caused by the earlier oil price hikes had collapsed. In compiling their accounting statements, the firms then took a variety of tacks. According to securities filings, Kawasaki Heavy Industries had positive operating profits in 1984 and 1986, but posted pre-tax losses. Mitsui Shipbuilding had operating losses of 28 billion yen in 1988, but increased its "non-operating income" and "extraordinary gains" to post a pre-tax gain. Hitachi Shipbuilding had operating losses of 37 billion that year, but similarly accrued "extraordinary gains" to post a pre-tax gain.
Those firms that did decide to post a pre-tax loss sometimes also replaced their board. As Table 6 shows, all but one of the principal shipbuilders posted at least one loss-year over 1986-88. Several also had high board turnover. In general, Japanese directors serve an average of eight years. Had they done so here, the firms would have had annual board turnover rates of 12 percent, and over the two years would have replaced about a quarter of their directors. Of the eight shipbuilding firms, only Kawasaki replaced fewer than a quarter. Two firms replaced about 30 percent, and two replaced about 40. Mitsubishi (with no loss years) replaced half, and two others replaced almost all.
[Insert Table 6 about here.] The loss firms that replaced their board did not necessarily appoint additional bankers. Despite the many changes the shipbuilding firms made to their boards, two firms cut the number of bankers on their board, and three kept it unchanged. One firm increased its banker directors by 1, and two increased them by 3.
As the shipbuilding example illustrates, board appointments at loss firms need not show that "pressures from banks, corporate shareholders, and corporate groups play an important role in linking firm performance and managerial rewards" (Kaplan & Minton, 1994: 257) . Instead, the appointments may just reflect a more general restructuring. For sometimes, a loss firm will replace most of its board --banker and non-banker alike. 23 Kaplan & Minton call the banker appointments a proxy for bank pressure. If the shipbuilding example generalizes to other industries, however, their conclusion may 22 E.g., Kothari (2001: 133) ; Pourciau (1993); Murphey & Zimmerman (1993) . Not all studies reach this conclusion. 23 Though the coefficient on earnings loss for appointments of directors from other corporations is not statistically significant in Kaplan & Minton (1994) . simply reflect their initial coding choice: they may be calling the phenomenon bank pressure only because bankers were the directors whose appointments they chose to code.
B. Delegation of Monitoring:
The conventional accounts also posit that the main bank serves as exclusive monitor: rather than waste resources in duplicative monitoring, secondary banks delegate all monitoring to a firm's main bank. Suppose banks did make these arrangements. If current and retired banker-directors monitor on behalf of banks, then virtually all banker directors should come from a firm's main bank.
Suppose, however, that secondary banks do not delegate their monitoring to the main bank. Given that the cost-effective level of monitoring will rise with the amount of money at stake, the bank that has lent the most (by definition, the "main bank") will still generate the most banker-directors. Because the other banks also lend substantial sums (the mean firm borrowed 29 to 33 percent of its bank debt from its main bank), however, these other banks will send substantial number of directors as well.
Our data show no evidence that secondary banks delegate monitoring to the main bank. In 1985, for example, our firms recruited only 57 percent of their retired bankerdirectors from their main bank. The mean firm had about 1.1 directors who had retired from any bank, but only 0.6 who had retired from its main bank. It had about 0.2 who concurrently worked at any bank, but only 0.04 to 0.08 who concurrently worked at its main bank.
C. Main Bank Rescues:
1. Introduction. By most accounts, Japanese banks implicitly agree to rescue those distressed clients for which they act as main bank. Although scholars vary in what they consider a rescue, many claim that the main bank agrees to lend the firm money even when other banks would refuse. The claim appears routinely, but is bedevilingly hard to test.
The claim is hard to test because it posits only an "implicit" deal --no firm or bank actually negotiates such an agreement. And even in Japan, firms do fail routinely (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2002a: 418) . Even there, banks do not necessarily rescue troubled clients. Absent identifiable contracts, the easy response to a bank that jettisons a distressed client is to claim ex post that the firm must not have had a main bank ex ante.
Some observers attribute the rescue obligation only to the more committed main banks (e.g., Sunamura, 1994: 298) , but this only compounds the problem.
24 Absent a way to identify "strong" ties ex ante, the easy response is --again --to turn the claim tautological: if a bank does not rescue a firm ex post, the firm must not have had strong ties with the bank ex ante.
Still other proponents claim that main banks agree to rescue only economically viable firms (Aoki, 2000: ch. 5; Patrick, 1994: 399) , but this variant is almost as nontestable as the others. Suppose a bank does not rescue a given firm. If the firm survives anyway, it must not have been truly distressed --and the bank would have faced no obligation to rescue. If the firm fails, it must not have been economically viable --and as it has now disappeared, that non-viability is almost impossible to contest.
To date, even main bank theorists have not tried systematically to show that these rescue agreements exist. They instead collect only anecdotes. To be sure, they collect many. In one study alone, Sheard (1994: 213-26) lists 42. Yet absent a more systematic approach, the anecdotes show only that some banks sometimes rescue some firms --and that, of course, is beside the point. Try as creditors might to avoid the quandary, sometimes they find that lending a defaulting debtor extra funds or renegotiating an debt will cut their losses. That they sometimes do either does not mean they agreed to rescue ex ante. It may just mean they failed to notice the firm's travails until it was too late to pull their loans.
Given these problems, we take a different approach. We first survey the extent to which firms rely on their lead banks for loans (Subsection 2). We ask which firms switch their lead banks (Subsection 3), and which increase the amounts they borrow from them (Subsections 4). We conclude by examining lead bank loans to a smaller sample of more seriously distressed firms (Subsection 5).
2. Main bank dependence. Suppose main banks provide implicit insurance policies against financial or economic distress. The firms most likely to be "collecting" on the policy will be those closest to insolvency. If so, then on average the nearly insolvent firms should be borrowing a larger fraction of their loans from their lead bank than the other firms.
In fact, the least profitable firms do not borrow more from their lead bank than other firms. Consider Table 7 . To construct the table, we partition the firms by their profitability (the columns) and by the total amounts they borrow from banks (the rows). For each of the resulting 16 cells, we then calculate the mean of the fraction of bank debt that the firms borrow from their main bank. We give the number of firms in each cell in parenthesis. We exclude firms that change their main bank during the period (generating uneven quartile sizes). Thus, in 1980-85, there were 12 firms that (i) did not change their main bank affiliation, (ii) were in the least profitable quartile, and (iii) were in the quartile that borrowed the least from banks. These 12 firms borrowed a mean .493 of their bank loans from their main bank.
At least during the 1980s, we find that the least profitable firms may have borrowed less from their main bank than their more profitable peers. During 1980-85, the 186 firms in the least profitable quartile borrowed 27.8 percent of their loans from their lead bank, while the firms in the other three quartiles borrowed 30.6; during 1986-90, firms in the least profitable quartile borrowed 32.0 percent from their lead bank while the others borrowed 33.9. Only during 1990-94 did the least profitable borrow more: then, they borrowed 34.4 percent while the others borrowed 33.8. None of the differences are significant at the 5 percent level, and the main bank loan fraction figures in Table 7 do not fall from left to right as the bank rescue hypothesis would predict.
[Insert Table 7 about here.] Given the asymmetric information among banks, all else equal firms might find it more efficient to borrow only from one bank. After all, the major Japanese banks are big enough to handle the debt of most of these firms. Nonetheless, they do not. Apparently, the firms worry about exactly the monopoly power that relationship-banking theory posits banks have, and diversify their loans to make certain they do not face it.
Because borrowing from any given bank does involve substantial fixed costs, however, a firm borrowing large amounts will more often find it cost-effective to borrow from several sources than will a firm borrowing less. If so, then the extent to which firms diversify their borrowing will increase with the total amounts they borrow. So Table 7 shows.
To clarify the correlation between outstanding debt levels and loan diversification (we do not claim to test causation), we offer a simple OLS regression of MB Loan Fraction on Total Loans (the source of the Table 7 Loans negatively, and with Profitability positively if at all. As one might expect, those firms that change main bank affiliation borrow a smaller fraction of their debt from their lead bank. Table 7 suggests two related observations, both of which imply that economically distressed firms do not collect on any bank-rescue insurance policy. First, among the firms most dependent on their main bank (the quartile with the least outstanding debt, where the MBLoan Fraction is highest), in each of the three periods more firms are in the profitable half than the unprofitable (for 1980-85, 93 firms compared to 32). Among the firms that borrow the most (very high outstanding debt), during the 1980s the most profitable firms relied more on their main bank (.292 for 1980-85) than the least (.215). More basically, neither comparison --nor any other aspect of Table 7 of which we are aware --suggests main banks offer distressed firms extra loans.
3. Main bank stability. --If main banks offer implicit insurance policies against financial distress, then the firms closest to insolvency should have the most stable relationship with their main bank. After all, a healthy 35 year-old might switch life 25 The absolute values of the Huber-White corrected robust t-statistics are in parenthesis. The coefficients on Total Loans are multiplied by 10 7 .
insurance firms, but not a terminally ill 80 year-old. By hypothesis, the troubled firm has paid the main bank its implicit insurance premia for years. At the very point at which it might collect on its implicit policy against financial distress, it will not cancel that insurance coverage and look for another carrier. If financially distressed firms do switch main banks, they do so either because the main bank has reneged on its rescue obligation or because it never offered coverage against distress in the first place. In fact, the two explanations come to much the same thing: if main banks regularly renege, no rational firm would pay the necessary premia ex ante; if no firms pay the premia, no rational bank would offer the rescue package ex post. If distressed firms regularly switch main banks, firms and main banks must not be contracting for insurance.
To explore these issues, in Panel A of Table 8 we calculate the percentage of firms in the lowest profitability quartile who change main bank affiliation during our three periods. We further compare that percentage with those of the top three quartiles. Lest we exaggerate the extent of the main bank shifts, we code as "main bank change" only those shifts that are definite. Where the data leave main bank affiliation unclear, we instead code the relationship as stable. For expositional simplicity, we do not partition firms by loan size. Instead, we simply extract the firms most likely to be collecting on their rescue insurance (the least profitable firms) and compare them against all others.
[Insert Table 8 about here.] According to Panel A, main bank relations are not stable. For each of the halfdecades, a fifth to a third of the firms switch their main banks. This is true not just of the higher performing firms but of those in the lowest quartile as well. The differences between the lowest quartile and the others are not significant at the 5 percent level.
Neither is a firm's propensity to switch main banks tied to its profitability. The correlation between Profitability and Main Bank Change is uniformly insignificant. Firms that switch once do tend disproportionately to switch again, however. Of the firms that switched main banks in 1980-85, 43 percent switched again in 1986-90 (but only 12 percent of the others). Of the firms that switched main banks in 1986-90, 58 percent switched again in 1990-94 (and 20 percent of the others).
As in the previous subsection, to explore the correlations (not causation) more closely we offer some simple OLS regressions: 1980-85: MB Change = .309 -2.12 Tot Lns + . Total Loans for all of the three periods. Whether a firm changed its main bank affiliation in one period also strongly predicts whether it will change it again in the next. Crucially, however, MB Change is largely not correlated with Profitability.
Increases in MB Loan
Fraction. --According to the conventional accounts, the main bank implicitly agrees to shoulder a disproportionate amount of any extra debt a troubled firm may need. In general, a main bank will be lending to healthy firms in rough proportion to its outstanding debt. To distressed firms, however, it should lend more than its proportional share.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we compare (a) the mean increase in the MB Loan Fraction for the distressed quartile of firms against (b) the mean increase at all other firms. By the standard accounts, the increase should be larger at the distressed firms than the others. It is not. Instead, for two of the three periods the main bank increased its debt share at the healthy firms more than it increased it at the distressed; for the third period, it cut back its share less at the healthy firms than at the distressed (the differences are not significant at the 5 percent level). During the booming 1980s (when by conventional wisdom most firms could freely borrow) the main bank lent to the profitable and unprofitable firms alike; once firms hit hard times in the 1990s, it may have favored the former over the latter. The moral is simple: the main bank does not help the least profitable firms. If anything, it avoids them.
Suppose a distressed firm needs additional debt: suppose, in other words, that it is economically healthy but financially distressed, and needs additional funds to invest in facilities that will help return it to financial health. If the main bank bears a disproportionate share of any additional loans to such firms, then the correlation coefficient at those firms between (i) the increase in Total Loans and (ii) the increase in MB Loan Fraction should be positive. In fact, according to Panel C, it is significantly negative: when a distressed firm increases its loans (172 firms in 1980-85, 152 in 1986-90, and 188 in 1990-94) , its main bank tends to fund less than its proportional share of the new debt.
Among the distressed firms that reduce their total loans (82, 109, and 78 firms, by period), the correlation between the increase in Total Loans and MB Loan Fraction is also negative. This is an ambiguous result. On the one hand, it could reflect main bank rescues: as other banks try to recover their debt before it becomes uncollectable, the main bank replaces their loans to help the firm stay in business. On the other, it could also reflect bad main bank management: the main bank failed to pull its loans as quickly as the other banks. Indeed, it may have become the main bank precisely because of that mismanagement --it may have become the firm's largest lender simply because it did not pull its loans as quickly as the others.
More basically, Panel C suggests that main banks do not favor distressed over profitable firms. In advancing the rescue hypothesis, theorists effectively claim that main banks agree implicitly to favor distressed firms over profitable firms. In fact, Panel C shows little difference in how a main bank responds to the two groups of firms. Even when bottom quartile firms fell on hard times in the 1990s, main banks did not treat them more favorably than their profitable competitors.
5. Failing firms, pre-1980s firms. --Finally, to explore bank lending at the most troubled firms, we examine loans to the 134 non-financial firms listed in an August 11, 1984 issue of the Japanese Business-Week equivalent (Shukan toyo keizai) as "endangered." These represent all exchange-listed non-financial firms with at least three consecutive loss (after interest but before extraordinary gains and losses) years as of 1984. Of the 134, 33 firms had disappeared from the exchanges by 2001, most through merger but about one-third through bankruptcy. The sample thus represents a more seriously distressed group than our bottom Profitability quartile. 26 Again, suppose main banks implicitly agree to lend distressed clients amounts they could not obtain elsewhere. If so, then among our firms a main bank should have increased its loan share during the years immediately before 1984. Consistent with the results from Table 8 , it did not (Tab. 9). Among the "endangered" firms, the main bank did not increase its share of the outstanding loans. Instead, it cut it. What is more, even as loans to Japanese businesses grew explosively in the late 1980s (see Tab. 1, Pan. A.), loans to these distressed firms stagnated (Tab. 9).
Nor was this absence of bank "rescues" a 1980s development. The 1974 oil crisis threw the Japanese economy into a prolonged recession. With business down, many firms posted losses, and as they did the business press published the predictable articles about the highest risk firms. In one April 1978 study, the Toyo keizai tokei geppo printed a list of 320 loss firms (i.e., firms with a loss carryforward). that "make banks tremble." For our purposes, note that the firms exhibited characteristics similar to those in the 1984 list. Of the 320 firms, 10.3 percent vanished immediately, and 20.9 percent had not recovered six years later: 33 firms disappeared (e.g., by liquidation, by merger, or simply by de-listing the stock) within a year, and 67 had remained sufficiently underperforming to qualify for the 1984 list. Of the 33 disappearing firms, 24 had been insolvent.
Of the 320 loss firms, 24.1 percent had recently changed main bank affiliation: i.e., 77 had shifted their main bank during the preceding three years. Among the 87 insolvent firms in the group, 32 (36.8 percent) had changed their main bank, and 24 (27.6 percent) had disappeared. Apparently, no bank stepped in to prevent the business disruption entailed in de-listing the stock. And of the 320 firms, consider the 113 with at least 10 billion yen debt in 1977. The records show no systematic evidence of serious main bank resues among these firms either: of the 113, 95 increased their debt during the next year, but the main bank increased its share of the debt only at about half of those 95 (52 firms; raising its mean loan share from 17.3 percent to 24.3 percent), and cut its share at the other half (43 firms; lowering its share from 19.9 percent to 15.4 percent).
D. Deregulation and Depression:
1. The connection. --To explore the possible connection between the alleged deregulation-induced decline of main-bank monitoring in the late 1980s and the depression in the 1990s, consider Table 10 . 27 To construct this panel, we divide the database into quartiles by a firm's 1986-90 Growth rate (Panel A). We then provide selected summary statistics for each quartile. For Panel B, we segment the data by a 26 For sample details and a further critique of the main-bank rescue literature, see Miwa (1996: 115-19) . 27 We take these assumptions as given only for the sake of argument. In fact, because the earlier regulation of lending behavior had not bound, the 1980s deregulation could not have significantly affected bank-borrower ties (Miwa & Ramseyer, 2003b) . Given that the "main bank system" had never existed, there was no "main bank monitoring" to decline.
In Miwa & Ramseyer (2003a) , we show that board composition did not change during the period at issue. Moreover, as Tab. 8 Pan. A., Tab. 10, and note [this + 1] infra of this paper show, bank loan patterns did not substantially change.
firm's 1990-94 Profitability and collect similar statistics. In Table 11 , we verify our conclusions with OLS --we do so by regressing 1990-94 performance (Profitability and Growth, as the dependent variables) on 1986-90 financial variables (including Profitability and Growth, as the independent variables).
Recall the conventional explanation for the 1990s depression: due to the earlier deregulation, main banks lost the ability to monitor; because of that reduced monitoring, firms played the bubble and expanded aggressively; when the bubble burst, the most aggressive firms failed. Theoretically coherent perhaps, the story does not fit the facts. Instead, the facts suggest a much more mundane tale: the best firms grew rapidly in the booming 1980s and weathered the troubled 1990s; the worst firms grew only haphazardly even during the 1980s, and floundered badly in the 1990s.
Most basically, the firms that expanded in the late 1980s did not collapse in the early 90s (Tab. 10, Pan. A.2). Despite the many claims to the contrary, the firms that aggressively expanded were not the ones that failed. Instead, the firms that grew in the late 1980s were firms that had faced good projects in the past, and continued to face them in the future: the high-growth firms in the late 1980s were the firms that had grown in the early 80s, and that continued to grow into the 90s (Tab. 10, Pan. A.1; Tab. 11).
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These fast-growing firms prospered (Tab. 10, Pan. A.2; Tab. 11). As befits firms facing the best projects, they had been among the most profitable in the early 1980s. They stayed profitable into the 90s.
The fast-growing firms in the late 1980s grew in part by borrowing heavily. Although they maintained lower leverage than the slower growing firms (presumably by expanding equity; Tab. 10, Pan. A.3), they dramatically increased the amounts they borrowed from banks (Pan. A.4). Only the slowest growing firms cut their bank loans. Predictably, the correlation between 1986-90 Growth and Total Bank Loan Incr is .08 (significant at the .02 level).
The fast-growing firms also borrowed heavily from their principal lender. Where the slowest growing firms borrowed only 30 percent from their principal lender, the highest growing quartile borrowed 40 (Tab. 10, Pan. A.5). The correlation between 1986-90 MB Loan Fraction and Growth is .13 (significant at .001), and between 1986-90 MB Loan Increase and Growth is .26 (significant at .001).
Not that the fast growing firms attributed any permanence to their "main bank ties" (Tab. 10, Pan. A.6). For each quartile in each half decade, the odds that a firm would switch main banks ranged from 15 to 40 percent. Yet where it ranged between 15 and 25 percent for the slowest growing firms, it ranged from 20 to 35 percent for the fastest. The correlation between 1986-90 MB Change and Growth is not statistically significant.
In Panel B of Table 10 , we undertake the reverse exercise: we segment the database by 1990-94 Profitability and trace the firms' antecedents. Preliminarily, note that firms were far from universally troubled even during the putative 1990s depression. Indeed, the most profitable half earned only marginally lower profits during the 28 The notion that any substantial disintermediation occurred is itself largely mythical. From 1979 to 1989, the total bank loans outstanding at all listed firms rose from 531 billion yen to 1,034 billion. Among the largest 30 borrowers, it rose from 222 billion to 576 billion, and among the largest 10 borrowers from 131 billion to 343 billion. The identity of the largest 30 borrowers remained largely unchanged during this period. Toyo (1991); see Miwa & Ramseyer (2003d) for details. depressed early 90s than they had during the booming late 80s (Pan. B.2; Miwa & Ramseyer, 2003d) .
As in Panel A, Panel B suggests that the firms skirting bankruptcy in the early 1990s were not firms that had grown rapidly in the late 1980s. Instead, they were firms that had been marginal all along. They had grown the least in the 80s, and had earned the lowest profits (Tab. 10 Pan. B.1; Tab. 11). Necessarily, they would have had the least chance of tapping the bond market, and the least chance of resisting bank intervention.
2. Industry-specific data. --To show that our conclusions are not the artifact of aggregating data across industries, in Appendix Table A-1 we add analogous information from several industries. Firm performance did, after all, vary from industry to industry, and from period to period. During 1980-85, for instance, 43.6 percent of the fastest growing quartile of firms were in the machinery industry, but only 2.9 percent in the construction industry; during 1986-90, 23.6 percent of the fastest quartile were in machinery, and 4.5 percent in construction. During 1980-85, 15 .1 percent of the slowest growing firms were in machinery, and 15.8 percent in construction; during 1986-90, 28.4 percent were in machinery, and 4.5 percent in construction.
Moreover, in explaining post-war Japanese economic growth observers have often focused on the machinery firms, while in addressing the 1990s malaise have focused on construction. For all these reasons, we include quartile data for the machinery firms in Panels E and F, and for construction firms in Panels A and B. To facilitate comparison, we add quartile data on the trade industry in Panels C and D. Largely, the results confirm the conclusions we reach on the basis of Table 10 .
III. Conclusions:
Relationship banking may indeed matter. With its present theoretical base in information-based "monopoly power," however, it does not matter at exchange-listed firms. It may explain some financing patterns at the small Japanese firms, just as it may explain some small-firm finance in the West. Yet to date, that is not how scholars have applied it to Japan. Instead, they have applied it through tales of a large-firm based "main bank system."
Unfortunately for the relationship-banking theorist, that "system" does not exist. And at least as applied to Japan through the concept of that "main bank system," relationship banking theory does not explain the 1980s Japanese asset-price increase. It does not explain the 1990s recession, does not appear in any monitoring through boards of directors, does not capture any delegation of monitoring duties among banks, and does not reflect any implicit contract to rescue troubled borrowers.
Japanese firms do sometimes appoint retired bankers to their boards --but most appoint none with a concurrent bank job, the majority of firms have no bankers at all, and few have more than one or two. Banks may sometimes take turns monitoring common debtors --but if they do, no trace of it appears in board appointment patterns. Japanese banks may sometimes bail out troubled firms --but after all, here or there, doing so sometimes lets a bank cut its losses ex post. And Japanese banks in the 1980s may well have spent fewer resources monitoring those borrowers that turned to the bond market --yet those were not the firms that failed.
At root, the theory of the Japanese "main bank system" is a theory without a phenomenon. At root, the only charitable interpretation of the system is that it does not exist, and probably never did. Consider it an urban legend, a fable: a tale we collectively repeat because we collectively wish it were true. And we wish it were true because of the way it illustrates the economics of information, and its implications for relationship banking theory and modern banking theory more generally.
Does relationship banking matter? Perhaps --perhaps it explains a variety of financing patterns among Japanese small firms operating in isolated areas, just as it may explain a variety of patterns among small regional firms in the West. Fundamentally, however, with its focus on the "monopoly power" a relational bank acquires over a firm through its investment in firm-specific information, relationship banking theory is a theory of small-firm finance in non-competitive financial markets. In their attempt to apply the theory to Japan, scholars have focused on the large, exchange-listed firms and their mythical "main bank" relationships. So applied, relationship banking theory emphatically does not matter. ----------------- 1980 1985 1990 1995 1980 1985 1990 1995 . In each case, we give the oefficients, followed by the absolute value of t-statistics (calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the parentheses below.
The regressions include a constant term, not reported here.
Sources: See Table 1 . In each case, we give the oefficients, followed by the absolute value of t-statistics (calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the parentheses below.
In the first column, we regress the stock of banker-directors at the firm in 1980, on the 1980-85 independent (financial) variables. In the second column, we regress the stock of 1985 banker-directors on the same independent variables.
Sources: See Table 1 . Notes: Those fiscal years from 1986-88 for which the firms posted pre-tax losses, followed by the board size in 1987, the number of directors in 1987 who had also served on the board in 1986, the number of 1987 directors who continued to serve in 1988, the number of 1986 directors who continued to 1988, the percentage of the board that turned over from 1986 to 1988, and the net increase in the number of retired or concurrent bankers on the board from 1986 to 1988. Sources: Securities filings, for appropriate years and firms. Notes: The data are partitioned into quartiles, by Profitability (by columns) and by Total Bank Loans (by rows). In each case, we give the Main Bank Loan Fraction for that cell, followed by the number of firms in that cell, in parentheses. Quartiles are uneven because we exclde firms that changed their main bank affiliation during the period.
Sources: See Table 1 . Note: *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
Panel A gives the fraction of firms that switched their main bank affiliation during the period, for each period.
Panel B gives the applicable correlation coefficient for each period. Panel C excludes firms that changed their main bank during a given period.
Panel D gives the correlation coefficient between (i) the increase in fraction of total outstanding bank debt that has been lent by the main bank and (ii) the increase in the total bank debt, for each periods. Panel D excludes firms that changed their main bank during a given period.
Sources: See Table 1 . Notes: The firms are the 134 non-financial exchangelisted firms listed in Shukan toyo keizai, Aug. 11, 1984, as having 3 or more consecutive loss years (after interest, but before extraordinary gains and losses). The "mean percentage borrowed" is the percentage of the total debt in each tier borrowed from the main bank. Debt categories are based on amounts outstanding as of March 1984.
Sources: See Table 1 . 1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 1980-85 1986-90 1990- 1980-85 1986-9 1990-94 1980-85 1986-90 1990- 1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 1980-85 1986-90 1990- 1980-85 1986-90 1990-94 1980-85 1986-90 1990- Notes: The dependent variables (Profitability and Growth) are from 1990-94, while all independent variables are from 1986-90. In each case, we give the coefficients, followed by the absolute value of t-statistics (calculated using OLS with robust standard errors) in the parentheses below.
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